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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1 
Amici are professors and scholars of the law of 
nonprofit organizations.2 Collectively, they have 
served as officials in all aspects of the administration 
of nonprofit law, including as head of the Charities 
Bureau in a state Attorney General’s office, Chief 
Counsel to a state Attorney General’s office, and a 
member of the IRS Advisory Committee on Tax 
Exempt and Governmental Entities, and as 
administrators of federal tax law pertaining to 
charities at the Joint Committee on Taxation, U.S. 
Department of Treasury, the Internal Revenue Service 
(“IRS”), and U.S. Department of Justice. They have 
founded research projects on charities regulation and 
oversight at think tanks and law schools, and they 
assist state Attorney General offices in studying and 
adopting new approaches to the regulation of charity 
and charitable solicitation.  
No party in this case represents all three of 
charity’s key stakeholders: charities, states, and 
taxpayers who underwrite the charities’ funding. 
Amici are participating in this litigation in order to aid 
the Court in understanding how these three interests 
depend on one another. They also attempt to provide a 
clearer understanding of state supervision of charities 
and how that supervision relates to federal tax law.  
                                            
1 Counsel for all parties have consented to the filing of this brief. 
Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6, amici affirm that no 
counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and 
that no person or entity other than amici curiae or their counsel 
made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation 
or submission of this brief. 
2 Amici are listed, with brief biographies, in the Appendix to this 
brief. 




SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
California has a compelling interest in sustaining 
its charitable sector, the nation’s largest. Petitioners 
challenge the State’s requirement that tax-exempt 
charities provide to the California Attorney General, 
on a confidential basis, a copy of the IRS Form 990 
Schedule B form that charities file annually with the 
Internal Revenue Service. Their challenge, if upheld, 
would undercut crucial and irreplaceable elements of 
California’s efforts to regulate its charitable sector and 
ensure public confidence in charities operating in the 
State. More than that, Petitioners’ same arguments 
could apply equally to central aspects of the federal 
regulation of charities and other major components of 
state supervision. Thus, whatever the applicable level 
of constitutional scrutiny, California’s collection of 
information about major charitable donors should 
survive review.  
Since before the founding of this nation, Attorneys 
General have worked to build and preserve charity. A 
gift to charity is fundamentally a matter of trust: trust 
that money placed in the hands of another, over whom 
the donor has few direct means of control, will go to its 
promised good purposes. Attorney General 
supervision supplies a strong basis for that trust, by 
ensuring that assets donated for charitable purposes 
are in fact used for those purposes.  
Attorney General supervision is necessary not only 
to prevent the fraud and deception that Petitioners 
emphasize. It is necessary also to protect the public’s 
interest against the potentially contrary private 
interests of an organization’s major donors, officers, 
and other “insiders” who may be in a position to make 
use of a charity’s resources for their own purposes 




rather than for the charitable ends the state and the 
charity’s other donors hope to foster.  
Seen in this light, California’s compelling interest 
in learning, on a confidential basis, the identities of an 
organization’s major donors—and that is all that 
Schedule B reveals, not “membership lists”—is 
evident. No legal regime can protect effectively against 
opportunistic behavior by insiders without being able 
to identify who those insiders are.  
By focusing narrowly on whether Schedule B was 
essential to particular investigations, Petitioners 
divert the Court’s attention from larger and more 
important systemic uses for major-donor information. 
For one, uniform reporting of such information, in a 
machine-readable format and in advance of any 
potential investigation for wrongdoing, streamlines 
and reduces the cost of supervising California’s 
115,000 charities and eliminates the need to initiate 
some costly and potentially burdensome 
investigations. California has approximately one 
attorney available for oversight of each 5,000 to 10,000 
charities. To even identify which transactions require 
more than minimal scrutiny, the state must first be 
able to see basic identifying and financial information 
and to match these items against each other for red 
flags. Schedule B makes this process efficient without 
imposing any additional administrative burden on 
charities. 
Information reporting also plays a major role in 
deterrence, as ample evidence has shown in many tax 
contexts. It is more difficult for a major donor to induce 
a charity to, for example, hire its donor as a contractor 
at supra-competitive prices, if the charity knows that 
both the donation and the contract will be reported to 
the State (on Schedule B and elsewhere on the 




charity’s federal tax return) and readily visible to the 
organization’s own compliance personnel. Petitioners’ 
focus on the number of individual investigations 
ignores this important function of the reporting 
requirements. Indeed, to the extent that deterrence is 
effective, one would expect to see fewer individual 
investigations based on Schedule B, because there are 
fewer actual instances of abuse.  
Petitioners’ suggestion that individual State 
requests for donor information should suffice is 
misguided. In addition to failing to serve this crucial 
deterrence purpose, such requests would often be more 
burdensome to donors than Schedule B itself. 
Investigations consume time and resources and may 
generate negative publicity that could impact other 
donations, often the life blood of these charities. All of 
these effects could in many instances be avoided if 
Schedule B information were available and 
exculpatory. In those situations where there is real 
wrongdoing, that wrongdoing could continue in the 
absence of Schedule B reporting, perhaps aided by 
spoliation of requested evidence, as investigative 
demands wend their way through courts. 
Finally, if Petitioners’ view of the major-donor 
reporting rule—taking it in isolation while ignoring its 
deterrent effects—were applied to many other 
components of charitable supervision by states and the 
IRS, they too might fall. Many charities must publicly 
report Schedule B information. Other publicly 
available data reported annually to California and the 
IRS similarly reveal personal information about a 
charity’s closest supporters, such as board members, 
key employees, contractors, and certain grantees. Like 
major-donor information, this information may not, 
standing alone, be directly useful to supervisory 




authorities but instead becomes meaningful when 
used in combination with other reported information. 
If requiring the provision of Schedule B to the State 
Attorney General on a confidential basis were 
unconstitutional because, in very rare instances, its 
accidental disclosure might deter association with a 
charity, these other forms of reporting might also be 
deemed constitutionally suspect. 
ARGUMENT 
I. California Has A Compelling Interest In 
Information About Substantial Donors  
Whatever the level of scrutiny applicable to 
California’s request for major-donor information, that 
request survives constitutional challenge because 
California’s interests would meet even the most 
demanding standard. California has compelling 
interests in preserving charitable assets held in trust 
for public use and in upholding public confidence in 
California charities, which are among the largest and 
most trusted in the country. The Attorney General’s 
access to information about major organizational 
supporters is essential to the Attorney General’s 
efforts to safeguard charitable assets and maintain the 
public’s trust in the charitable sector. 
A. California’s Interest in Supervising 
Charities and Charitable Solicitation 
A state Attorney General’s power to supervise 
charitable organizations is deeply enshrined in the 
fabric of American law, with roots older than this 
country. Even before the English Statute of Charitable 
Uses in 1601, the Attorney General (of the Crown) had 
the power to bring suit to enforce a charitable trust. 
Marion Fremont-Smith, Governing Nonprofit 
Organizations 27, 32-34 (2004); Restatement of the 




Law, Charitable Nonprofit Organizations § 5.01(a), (c) 
(Am. L. Inst., 2021); Robert Carlson & Caitlin Calder, 
Protection and Regulation of Nonprofits and 
Charitable Assets, in State Attorneys General Powers 
and Responsibilities, Nat’l Ass’n of Att’ys Gen. 215-
216 (Emily Myers ed., 2018). This common law power 
eventually provided the basis for the power of the 
Attorneys General of the various states. Governing 
Nonprofit Organizations at 305-14, 324. 
States grant Attorneys General power to regulate 
charity to ensure that charitable assets are preserved 
irrevocably for public benefit. “The state attorney 
general . . . has the authority to protect charitable 
assets and interests within the jurisdiction of the state 
. . . .” Restatement of the Law, Charitable Nonprofit 
Organizations § 5.01; see Cal. Gov’t Code § 12598(a).3 
“[A]ll the assets of a corporation organized solely for 
charitable purposes must be deemed to be impressed 
with a charitable trust by virtue of the express 
declaration of the corporation’s purposes . . . [S]aid 
property [is] therefore ‘irrevocably dedicated’ to 
exempt purposes . . . .” Pacific Home v. County of Los 
                                            
3 The regulatory framework for charities oversight in the United 
States is complex, with state Attorneys General and federal 
officials including the IRS, Department of Treasury, Federal 
Trade Commission, and even the United States Postal Office 
constituting a regulatory ecosystem. Each of these offices or 
agencies has its own jurisdiction, some of which is concurrent 
with other offices, some of which stands alone. This “interlocking 
jurisdiction” affords states the primary role in overseeing 
governance, trusts, solicitation, charities registration compliance 
and corporate transactions, both through civil and criminal 
jurisdiction. Protection and Regulation of Nonprofits and 
Charitable Assets, 216-218; Cindy M. Lott & Marion Fremont-
Smith, State Regulatory and Legal Framework, in Nonprofits and 
Government: Collaboration and Conflict 164 (Elizabeth T. Boris 
& C. Eugene Steuerle eds., 2016). 




Angeles, 41 Cal. 2d 844, 852 (1953). As described in a 
leading casebook on nonprofit organizations:  
The attorney general represents the 
public in enforcing the purposes of the 
trust or corporation. The common law 
duties of the attorney general reflected 
the expectations of society: that there 
should be a single evolving duty to carry 
out the charitable purposes of the trust, 
that it was necessary to keep trust 
property productive, and that trustees 
should be prohibited from diverting 
charitable funds for improper purposes 
or self-dealing.  
James J. Fishman et al., Nonprofit Organizations: 
Cases and Materials 204 (5th ed. 2015).  
To preserve the public’s interest in charitable 
property and its uses, state laws grant Attorneys 
General power not only to investigate and gather 
information about charities in their jurisdiction, but 
also—unlike the authority of the IRS under federal 
law—to exercise broad regulatory and enforcement 
authority over charitable solicitations. Protection and 
Regulation of Nonprofits and Charitable Assets, at 
229. An Attorney General may require an accounting 
of an organization’s assets and may “investigate 
transactions and relationships of directors and 
trustees to determine whether property held or used 
by them has been allocated to charitable purposes.” 
Nonprofit Organizations at 204-05. Moreover, 
Attorneys General may enjoin or impose 
restitutionary duties on an organization’s officers and 
managers. Id. They may remove directors or trustees 
chosen by the organization and, in extreme cases, even 
wholly dissolve the entity and distribute its assets to 




other charitable uses. Id. All of these common-law and 
statutory powers and tools are wielded, however, by a 
small cohort of state charities regulators who, as of 
2013, numbered fewer than 400 state attorney-general 
staffers overseeing more than one million nonprofits 
in the United States. Cindy M. Lott et al., State 
Regulation and Enforcement in the Charitable Sector 
8 (2016); Elizabeth T. Boris & Cindy M. Lott, 
Reflections on Challenged Regulators, in Regulating 
Charities: The Inside Story 104 (Myles McGreggor-
Lowndes and Bob Wyatt eds., 2017).  
Most enforcement authority rests uniquely with 
Attorneys General. “In most states only the attorney 
general has the power and standing to intervene and 
investigate misappropriations of charitable funds, 
breaches of fiduciary duty and self-dealing by 
directors, and fraud in charitable solicitations.” 
Protection and Regulation of Nonprofits and 
Charitable Assets, at 215. “Since there is usually no 
one willing to assume the burdens of a legal action, or 
who could properly represent the interests of the trust 
or the public, the Attorney General has been 
empowered to oversee charities as the representative 
of the public.” Holt v. College of Osteopathic Physicians 
& Surgeons, 61 Cal. 2d 750, 754 (1964). If the Attorney 
General fails to enforce the law, no one else will.  
Attorney General oversight works to ensure donor 
trust. Better Business Bureau Wise Giving Alliance 
Donor Trust Report 2020, 10 (2020) https://www.
give.org/docs/default-source/donor-trust-library/2020-
donor-trust-report.pdf. Many donors would not 
support charitable endeavors if they believed that the 
organization’s insiders, including major donors, would 
profit from their contribution or otherwise divert 
charitable assets for the insiders’ own private 




purposes. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 
494 U.S. 652, 675 n.6 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring) 
(citing Henry Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit 
Enterprise, 89 Yale L.J. 835, 843-845 (1980)). States 
with stronger reporting requirements experience less 
self-dealing. Mihir A. Desai & Robert J. Yetman, 
Constraining Managers without Owners: Governance 
of the Not-for-Profit Enterprise, 4 J. Governmental & 
Nonprofit Accounting 53, 69 (2015). Donors give more 
to charities in states with greater protections against 
managerial self-dealing. Fisman & Hubbard, 
Precautionary Savings and the Governance of 
Nonprofit Organizations, 89 J. Pub. Econ. 2231, 2240-
41 (2005). And fraud or improper dealing by one 
charity can negatively affect the reputation of many 
others. Mark S. LeClair, Reported Instances of 
Nonprofit Corruption: Do Donors Respond to Scandals 
in the Charitable Sector?, 22 Corp. Reputation Rev. 39 
(2019); Joanne G. Carman, What You Don’t Know Can 
Hurt Your Community: Lessons from a Local United 
Way, 21 Nonprofit Management and Leadership 433 
(2011).  
Accordingly, the States uniformly prohibit self-
dealing transactions between a charity and certain of 
its insiders. Governing Nonprofit Organizations, at 
217. A charity may not distribute profits to these 
insiders, such as by paying them excessive 
compensation or by entering into sweetheart deals for 
the charity’s use of the insider’s property. Id. 
Charitable assets of the organization may not be used 
for the private benefit of insiders, except to the extent 
that such use is merely incidental to some public-
regarding charitable purpose. In re Los Angeles 
County Pioneer Soc’y, 40 Cal. 2d 852, 860 (1953). Thus, 
a charity may not be used as means of generating 
business for its major donors or other insiders. See 




Complaint at 8, 9, 13, People v. L.B. Research & Educ. 
Found., No. BC 421250 (L.A. Super. Ct., filed Sept. 8, 
2009), https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/attachments/
press_releases/n1799_lbresearch.pdf (alleging dona-
tions-for-business scheme); AFPF JA 415. 
Attorney General oversight of charitable 
solicitation serves ends similar to those of donor and 
contractor oversight. As with investors in securities, a 
charity’s financial supporters “would hesitate to 
venture their capital in a market . . . unchecked by 
law.” United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 
(1997). Regulation to prevent fraudulent or misleading 
solicitation thus preserves funders’ confidence and, 
with that, the stream of funding itself. Id. “Attorney 
general action is imperative to protect consumers, 
uphold the reputation of the charitable sector, and 
encourage the continued generosity of the public.” 
Protection and Regulation of Nonprofits and 
Charitable Assets at 229; see Restatement of the Law, 
Charitable Nonprofit Organizations § 5.01 cmt. d. 
California enjoys one of the nation’s largest and 
most widely supported charitable sectors. As of June 
2018, charities registered in California reported $295 
billion in annual income and net assets of $851 billion. 
Cal. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General’s Guide for 
Charities 1 (2020). At about that time, charities 
nationwide held about $3.8 trillion in assets, 
indicating that California registrants represent about 
22.4% of the charitable assets in the entire nation. 
Urban Institute, National Center for Charitable 
Statistics, The Nonprofit Sector in Brief 2019 (June 
2020), https://nccs.urban.org/publication/nonprofit-
sector-brief-2019#the-nonprofit-sector-in-brief-2019. 




Its charitable sector is nearly three times as large, on 
a per-capita basis, as amicus Arizona.4  
California has a compelling interest in preserving 
the integrity and vibrancy of its charitable sector, 
safeguarding assets already under charitable control, 
and encouraging further contributions. Other states 
may prefer a light-touch strategy in which regulatory 
burdens, and perhaps donor trust, are lower. 
Compare, e.g., Cal. Gov’t Code § 12581 (requiring 
registration of “all charitable corporations . . . over 
which the state . . . has enforcement or supervisory 
powers”), with Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3722 
(requiring state registration only for charities 
soliciting funds for veterans organizations).5 Each 
state has a compelling interest in developing its own 
vision of how best to support and regulate private 
charity, and different states have made different 
choices. See Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing 
Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 623 (2003). 
                                            
4 California’s population of 39.5 million, U.S. Census, Quick Facts 
California (July 1, 2019), https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/CA, 
is just 12% of the nation’s 328.2 million, U.S. Census, Quick Facts 
United States (July 1, 2019), https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/
fact/table/US/PST045219. In contrast, Arizona nonprofits held 
just $48 billion in assets, or 1.3% of the national total. 
Independent Sector, State Profile – Arizona (Mar. 18, 2020), 
https://independentsector.org/resource/state-profile-arizona/. 
Arizona’s population of 6.4 million is 2% of the national total. U.S. 
Census, Quick Facts Arizona (July 1, 2019), 
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/AZ.  
5 A comprehensive summary of state enforcement policies is 
available at The Legal Compendium, Urban Inst. (Oct. 29, 2019), 
https://www.urban.org/policy-centers/center-nonprofits-and-
philanthropy/projects/regulation-charitable-sector-project (click 
link to “Download the Legal Compendium” to download the 
spreadsheet).  




B. Information About Substantial Donors 
Is an Integral Part of Charities 
Supervision 
Contrary to repeated suggestions from Petitioners, 
this is a case about confidential reporting of 
information to government officials, not about any 
broader disclosure to the public. Federal law already 
obliges charitable organizations to share detailed 
information about their finances, organizational 
structure, and activities with the public. 26 U.S.C. § 
6104(d)(1). But, even when reported to government, 
information about most charities’ donors is 
confidential, 26 U.S.C. § 6104(d)(3)(A), and a 
government official who willfully reveals such 
confidential information outside certain statutorily 
authorized circumstances has committed a federal 
crime, 26 U.S.C. §§ 6103, 7213. The reporting 
obligation challenged here should stand or fall based 
on whether confidentially reporting donor information 
to government regulators serves a sufficiently 
important governmental purpose.6  
A legal regime intended to guard against 
opportunistic behavior by insiders cannot function 
unless regulators can identify the insiders. Major 
donors, no less than other insiders, may be able to 
divert resources from charitable goals to their own 
uses. Identifying and policing transactions with major 
donors thus serves an important role in preserving 
                                            
6 Making such data available to potential supporters increases 
donor support by allowing donors to distinguish high-performing 
charities from their competitors. Putnam Barber et al., Does 
Mandatory Disclosure Matter? The Case of Nonprofit 
Fundraising, 50 Nonprofit & Voluntary Sector Q. __ (forthcoming 
2021). Thus, certain public disclosures about charities that do 
occur may actually increase, not discourage, donations. 




public confidence in the charitable sector. George G. 
Triantis, Organizations as Internal Capital Markets: 
The Legal Boundaries of Firms, Collateral, and Trusts 
in Commercial and Charitable Enterprises, 117 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1102, 1147-48 (2004) (noting that cross-
monitoring of other donors is important to charitable 
contributors but difficult for them to accomplish on 
their own). 
Indeed, federal law recognizes that large 
contributors to an organization are often in a position 
to exert control over the operations of the donee 
charity. Federal law, like that of California and other 
states, restricts certain transactions between insiders 
and the charity. 26 U.S.C. § 4958. For these purposes, 
federal law defines insiders to include “substantial 
contributors.” 26 U.S.C. §§ 507(d)(2)(A), 4958(c)(3)(C); 
26 C.F.R. § 53.4958-3(e)(2)(ii). A substantial 
contributor is “any person who contributed . . . an 
aggregate amount of more than $5,000 . . . if such 
amount is more than 2 percent of the total 
contributions . . . received” for the year. 26 U.S.C. § 
507(d)(2)(A). 
IRS reporting requirements are designed to ensure 
that the Service can enforce these limitations. Not 
coincidentally, the donors an organization must report 
on Schedule B of its tax return are exactly those who 
would qualify as substantial contributors. See Internal 
Revenue Service, Form 990 Schedule B Instructions 
for 2020.  
Petitioners argue that donor information is 
unnecessary to uncover fraud. Foundation Br. 1, 8, 31. 
Even if that were true (and it is not), it would neglect 
the fact that Attorney General oversight guards not 
only against fraud but also against insider self-dealing 
more generally. A major donor can influence board 




decisions about vendors, grantees, expenditures, and 
sale or lease of charitable assets—all decisions that 
can result in a benefit flowing back to the donor or the 
donor’s family. Organizations already report key 
employees, grantees, and major contractors. Internal 
Revenue Service, Form 990. Without major-donor 
information, there would be no indication in the 
organization’s filings to show when grants or contracts 
are awarded to influential donors. Has the 
organization, for example, hired a key employee who 
happens to be its main supporter’s underqualified 
child? Without donor information, a regulator cannot 
easily know. 
Petitioners make much of the supposed fact that 
California points to relatively few reported instances 
in which substantial-contributor information was 
central to a fraud investigation, but Petitioners 
apparently fail to understand basic features of how 
deterrence works. Unfortunately, attempted fraud 
within and by ostensible charities is not rare. E.g., 
Kris Hundley & Kendall Taggart, America’s 50 Worst 
Charities Rake in Nearly $1 Billion for Corporate 
Fundraisers, Tampa Bay Times (Oct. 2, 2017); see 
Janet Greenlee et al., An Investigation of Fraud in 
Nonprofit Organizations: Occurrences and Deterrents, 
36 Nonprofit & Voluntary Sector Q. 676, 677 (2007) 
(noting more than 2,000 fraudulent Internet sites 
soliciting donations for Katrina relief); Deborah S. 
Archambeault et al., Fraud and Corruption in U.S. 
Nonprofit Entities: A Summary of Press Reports 2008-
2011, 44 Nonprofit & Voluntary Sector Q. 1194, 1215 
(2015) (“[N]onprofit fraud continues to be a significant 
and costly issue.”). Even if it were true that the 
number of litigated fraud cases involving donor 
information were small, that would be fully consistent 
with the importance of major-donor reporting, 




because, as discussed further below, that reporting 
itself helps prevent fraud. In essence, Petitioners 
argue that, since houses with large guard dogs are 
never robbed, guard dogs must be unnecessary. The 
scarcity of observed instances of fraud in states with 
more modest enforcement regimes also does not shed 
light on the efficacy of California’s regime, because 
those states may, in the absence of major-donor 
disclosure, fail to detect many fraud cases.  
Lastly, Petitioners seem to suggest that IRS 
requirements are not relevant to whether California 
needs major-donor information, because the Attorney 
General does not directly dispense tax benefits. 
Foundation Br. 45-46; Law Center Br. 54. States share 
with federal tax law, however, the common goal of 
protecting charitable resources from diversion to 
private purposes. Staff of Joint Comm. on Internal 
Revenue Taxation, 91st Cong., General Explanation of 
the Tax Reform Act of 1969 52-53 (Comm. Print Dec. 
3, 1970). In any event, if a nonprofit breaches or loses 
its federal tax-exempt status, that may directly impact 
that nonprofit’s status under state law as well. E.g., 
Cal. Corp. Code § 5260. States have their own discrete 
interest in substantiating federal tax-exempt status as 
well as adherence to their own state laws. Thus, the 
Internal Revenue Code requires the Treasury 
Department to notify “the appropriate State officer,” 
which includes the state Attorney General, when the 
IRS refuses to recognize the charitable status of an 
organization, revokes a charity’s tax exemption, or 
imposes certain taxes on a charity. 26 U.S.C. § 
6104(c)(1). 




C. Schedule B Is Narrowly Tailored to 
Obtain Information Necessary to 
Charities Supervision 
In an apparent effort to liken this case to prior 
cases involving membership lists, Petitioners 
repeatedly and inaccurately describe Schedule B as a 
“sweeping” or “blanket” demand for donor information. 
Foundation Br. 2, 8, 19; Law Center Br. 25, 33, 35. To 
the contrary, Schedule B requires reporting only of 
those donors who are in a position to exert influence 
comparable to other insiders. More specifically, the 
Schedule B obliges nonprofits such as Petitioners to 
provide, on a confidential non-public basis, identifying 
information for donors that give the greater of $5,000 
or 2 percent of the organization’s support for the year. 
An organization with $1 billion in annual 
contributions would report only donors who had given 
$20 million dollars or more. 
Thus, in practice, Schedule B’s disjunctive test 
limits donor reporting to a select group of large donors. 
As applied to Petitioner Americans for Prosperity 
Foundation, the two-percent rule means that, for 
2014, only donors who gave more than about $429,000 
would have to be reported. For 2018, the threshold was 
approximately $340,000. Internal Revenue Service, 
Form 990: Return of Organization Exempt from 
Income Tax: Americans for Prosperity Foundation 
(2018), available at https://projects.propublica.org/
nonprofits/display_990/521527294/
02_2020_prefixes_47-52%2F521527294_201812_990_
2020021417150111. For Petitioner Thomas More, the 
two-percent disclosure thresholds in those respective 
years were approximately $35,650 and $31,700. 
Internal Revenue Service, Form 990: Return of 
Organization Exempt from Income Tax: Thomas More 








Requiring donors of such substantial sums to be 
confidentially reported to government regulators is 
hardly a “dragnet” capturing small donors or all 
members. Of course, whether any particular 
contribution is “major” or “substantial” is a relative 
question, and the major-donor thresholds therefore 
depend on organization size: the less an organization 
raises, the lower the contribution thresholds for 
substantial contributors. Far from being a blanket 
demand for an organization’s donors or members, the 
Schedule B is carefully tailored to capture only those 
donors who are particularly relevant to charitable 
oversight: those who, by virtue of their substantial 
support for the organization, are in a position to 
influence or take advantage of the organization’s 
affairs. 
Accordingly, California’s requirement is a far cry 
from the sort of demand for membership lists that was 
at issue in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 
U.S. 449 (1958); Gibson v. Florida Legislative 
Investigation Committee, 372 U.S. 539 (1963); and the 
other cases cited by Petitioners. Donors making 
contributions of thousands of dollars a year are not the 
“rank-and-file members” with which the Court was 
concerned in NAACP. 357 U.S. at 464. They are 
instead more closely akin to persons who “hold official 
positions” with the organization, the identities of 
which were not at issue in that case. Id.  
Petitioners do briefly acknowledge that California’s 
reporting requires information on only a narrow slice 
of donors; but, rather than admitting that this fact 




takes their case outside the ambit of NAACP, they try 
to spin it to their advantage by arguing that the 
reporting obligation is too limited to be useful. 
Foundation Br. 47. But the reason California requires 
reporting only of those major donors listed in Schedule 
B is precisely because it is the identity of these 
donors—those tending to have “substantial influence 
over the affairs of an organization,” 26 C.F.R. § 
53.4958-3(e)(2)(ii)—that is most relevant to charitable 
enforcement. As discussed above, California has a 
longstanding duty to protect charitable assets, and the 
identity of substantial contributors in particular is 
directly related to enforcing that duty. 
Historical context also suggests the relatively 
modest scope of California’s donor reporting. The 
origins of the Schedule B requirement are 80 years old. 
In 1941, the very first version of the informational 
return for charities (now known as the Form 990) 
required an itemized list of contributions exceeding 
$4,000. Cheryl Chasin et al., Form 990, Internal 
Revenue Service, 2002 Exempt Organizations 
Continuing Professional Education Materials 227, 
available at https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotop
icg02.pdf. In 1947, in the next version of the form, 
filers were required to provide “a list of large 
contributors” with a lower reporting threshold of 
$3,000. Id. at 228  
Reporting requirements expanded in 1969. Before 
that year, most of the tax-exempt sector did not have 
to file an annual return. Concerns about self-dealing 
and other abuses led to a general requirement that 
“every exempt organization must file an annual 
information return” (with exceptions for churches, 
certain religious orders, and very small organizations). 
General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 at 




53. As explained by the Congressional Joint 
Committee on Taxation at the time: “The Congress 
concluded that experience of the past two decades 
indicated that more information is needed on a more 
current basis from more organizations and that this 
information should be made more readily available to 
the public, including State officials.” General 
Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 at 52-53 
(emphasis added). 
In 1969, Congress expanded both the universe of 
mandatory filers and the information required on the 
form: 
[Required] to be shown on each 
information return [are] the names and 
addresses of all substantial contributors, 
directors, trustees, and other 
management officials and of highly 
compensated employees. Compensation 
and other payments to managers and 
highly compensated employees also must 
be shown. All this information is to be 
available to the public, except for the 
names and addresses of substantial 
contributors to exempt organizations 
other than private foundations. (The 
non-private foundations, are, however, 
required to disclose those names to the 
Internal Revenue Service.) 
General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 at 
53. 
The 1969 Act also requires disclosure of highly 
detailed information about charitable organizations, 
their beneficiaries, and those who work with them. 
Organizations must report the names, hours worked, 




and in many cases compensation of board members, 
officers, and other key employees. Form 990 passim. 
Grant recipients are identified by name and taxpayer 
i.d. number, the amount of grant received, and the 
purposes of the grant. Internal Revenue Service, Form 
990 Schedule I Instructions (2020). All this reported 
information is freely available to the public. 26 U.S.C. 
§ 6104(d)(3)(A). If association with a reporting charity 
bears some public opprobrium, it may fall on all these 
publicly named persons and entities as readily as on 
donors, and it is more likely to do so where, in contrast 
to the confidential reporting of donors at issue here, 
the information is public. 
The public nature of so much charitable 
information also undermines Petitioners’ claim that 
California’s reporting requirement threatens their 
associational freedoms. The claim is specious. As 
Petitioner APF  acknowledges, Foundation Br. 50-51, 
whether or not its donations from private foundations 
appear on its Schedule B, private foundations are 
themselves required by federal law to publicly disclose 
their grants. 26 U.S.C. § 6104(d)(1), (3)(A). Any 
harassment is far more likely the result of such public 
disclosure by the grantor private foundation. 
The information reported to California on Schedule 
B is very modest when viewed in the context of 
charitable disclosures more generally. As a sovereign 
State, California could have developed its own 
information-reporting regime, its own definition of 
“substantial contributor,” and its own form. Instead, 
California opted to rely on long-established forms and 
reporting rules already familiar to charities and their 
supporters, thereby minimizing any incremental 
burdens from dual reporting. The information 




requested is tailored narrowly to fit the enforcement 
regime for which it is needed.  
II. Subpoena Power Cannot Substitute for 
Schedule B Disclosure 
Petitioners argue that, even if major-donor 
information is relevant to charitable supervision, the 
Schedule B reporting requirement is overbroad 
because California has other means to obtain the same 
information. Foundation Br. 31-32, 34-36; Law Center 
Br. 38. Specifically, Petitioners suggest that California 
could request donor information with respect to select 
charities through subpoena or similar investigative 
powers. Id. 
This argument fails to understand the unique role 
that mandatory annual reporting serves in charitable 
oversight. The obligation to report donor information 
each year, and in advance of any particular audit or 
other enforcement action, offers several key 
advantages over document requests initiated during 
the investigative process. 
A. Major-Donor Information is Often 
Necessary to Identify Which 
Organizations Should be Subject to 
Investigation 
Obtaining donor information by subpoena or other 
document request would be an ineffective substitute 
for Schedule B reporting, because donor information is 
often needed before the Attorney General can even 
open an investigation.  
First, donor identity must frequently be 
established before the Attorney General may even 
assert jurisdiction. While the Attorney General has 
jurisdiction to supervise charitable solicitation of 
California residents, Cal. Bus. and Prof. Code 




§§ 17510-17510.95, this jurisdiction may be invoked 
only if an organization’s donors are known and they 
are confirmed to include Californians. 
Next, major-donor information provides one of the 
few efficient tools for identifying suspicious activity at 
an organization. The California Attorney General 
supervises more than 115,000 charities, Attorney 
General’s Guide for Charities at 1, with a staff of 
approximately a dozen full-time attorneys, Garry W. 
Jenkins, Incorporation Choice, Uniformity, and the 
Reform of Nonprofit State Law, 41 Ga. L. Rev. 1113, 
1128 (2007); see State Regulation and Enforcement in 
the Charitable Sector at 8 (reporting little change in 
AG staffing in ten years following Jenkins survey). 
Any practical enforcement strategy must enable the 
Attorney General to readily identify transactions that 
require more than minimal scrutiny. Matching 
substantial contributors to other items on the tax 
return, such as employees, contractors, and grantees, 
can allow the regulator to focus on this narrower set of 
potential red-flag transactions. AFPF JA 413-414; 
AFPF C.A.E.R. 577-578, 716-718, 1062.  
Donor information has been central to identifying 
and remedying many major instances of improper self-
dealing at charitable organizations. Credit-counseling 
organizations provide a notable example. See 
Profiteering in a Nonprofit Industry: Abusive 
Practices in Credit Counseling, S. Rep. No. 109-55 
(2005). These purportedly charitable entities were 
intended to provide education to desperate debtors 
and assist them in managing debt repayment plans. 
Id. at 4-5. In fact, many instead served the interests of 
creditors, to the detriment of the organizations’ 
supposed beneficiaries. Id. Creditors who stood to 
benefit from “counseling” provided to beneficiaries 




proved to be major supporters of the most problematic 
credit-counseling agencies, providing a key clue to 
investigators. See California Department of 
Corporations, Study of the Consumer Credit 
Counseling Industry in California and 
Recommendations to the Legislature Regarding the 
Establishment of Fees for Debt Management Plans and 
Debt Settlement Plans 5 n.12 (March 1, 2003) (defining 
fair share payments and considering them to often be 
kickbacks). 
So-called “down-payment-assistance” organiza-
tions offer another important example. Sellers of 
homes would contribute dollars to the down-payment-
assistance “charity.” Those dollars would then be 
granted to a low-income buyer, enabling the buyer to 
make a 3% down payment to buy a home. States and 
the IRS cracked down on these organizations after 
they determined that they were more a scam to sell 
homes and issue mortgages than an actual charitable 
effort to put people in homes. See Rev. Rul. 2006-27, 
2006-1 C.B. 915; Internal Revenue Service, Down 
Payment Assistance Programs: Questions and Answers 
(August 29, 2011). Again, the fact that large donors to 
the organization directly benefited from their own 
contributions was a central piece of evidence that 
these organizations were not serving the public’s 
interest. See Rev. Rul. 2006-27. 
These examples about credit-counseling 
agencies and down-payment-assistance organizations 
illustrate but two of many ways in which Schedule B 
aids in ferreting out improper activities. It does so as 
well in numerous other situations, such as inflated 
gifts-in-kind and loans disguised as donations. Resp. 
Br. 7-8. 




B. Annual Reporting Contributes to 
Deterrence  
In addition to assisting the Attorney General 
directly, the substantial-contributor reporting 
requirement puts organizations on notice that the 
Attorney General has the information necessary to 
monitor possible self-dealing and excess benefit 
transactions between the organization and its 
principal donors. Awareness of such monitoring itself 
deters organizations from engaging in such 
transactions.  
This role for reporting of information about major 
donors is consistent with modern tax systems’ 
approach to information reporting generally. A tax 
system could require taxpayers to report only 
identifying information and their self-assessment of 
their tax liabilities, with further details required only 
from those taxpayers chosen for audit. But routine 
submission of more comprehensive financial 
information has key enforcement advantages. Tax 
systems require broader information reporting on 
annual returns because, when a taxpayer affirms that 
the detailed information submitted is accurate, that 
has both deterrence and liability implications. Henrik 
J. Kleven et al., Why Can Modern Governments Tax So 
Much? An Agency Model of Firms as Fiscal 
Intermediaries, 83 Economica 219 (2016); see Jay A. 
Soled, Homage to Information Returns, 27 Va. Tax 
Rev. 371, 371-73 (2007) (“Most studies indicate that 
such returns are pivotal in causing taxpayers to be 
forthright in their reporting practices. These same 
studies indicate that in the absence of such returns, 
taxpayer compliance plummets.”); Margot L. 
Crandall-Hollick & Conor F. Boyle, Cong. Rsch. Serv., 
R44993, Child and Dependent Care Tax Benefits: How 




They Work and Who Receives Them 13 (Feb. 1, 2021) 
(noting that requiring tax-return reporting of 
dependents’ social security number led to sharp 
decline in number of dependents falsely claimed on 
returns).  
C. Requesting Donor Information After an 
Investigation Commences Is Less 
Effective and Adds Unnecessary 
Burdens on Charities 
Petitioners’ suggestion that the Attorney General 
should instead rely upon California’s subpoena power 
as a less intrusive alternative to confidential 
mandatory reporting of the identity of substantial 
contributors misapprehends the way in which charity 
investigations are conducted. That suggestion, if 
followed, would potentially expose filing organizations 
to greater harm while undermining the Attorney 
General’s ability to supervise charities effectively.  
Information reporting is an important tool for 
preliminary stage investigations because, contrary to 
Petitioners’ apparent assumption, California is not 
empowered to issue subpoenas to filers on a whim. The 
State must be able to demonstrate a factual basis 
showing that the information sought is “reasonably 
relevant” to a matter within the Attorney General’s 
authority or its subpoena may be quashed. People v. 
West Coast Shows, Inc., 10 Cal. App. 3d 462, 470 
(1970). Major-donor information, along with other 
evidence, allows the state to develop a basis for 
issuance of a subpoena. For example, identification of 
major donors in Schedule B, combined with 
information about transactions in which the 
organization engaged with those same entities or 
persons, would be critical evidence that could serve in 
support of a subpoena. AFPF JA 402. 




Being forced to use subpoena power to obtain 
major-donor information may also undermine the 
success of well-founded investigations. Schedule B 
information enables the State to assemble evidence of 
solicitation fraud, illegal self-dealing, or other 
violations of law without alerting a filer to the 
pendency of the investigation. See SEC v. Jerry T. 
O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 750-51 (1984) (explaining 
policy rationales for keeping third-party information 
requests confidential). For example, the State can 
contact third-party sources in order to understand the 
nature of transactions between the charity and major 
donors. Demanding major-donor information from 
filers in the preliminary stages of an inquiry would 
invariably delay the course of an investigation and 
might prompt the destruction of documents or other 
evidence by the investigation’s target. Id. In cases of 
fraud, for example, even brief delays can provide the 
organization with opportunities to dispose of evidence, 
manufacture further fraudulent evidence, or 
otherwise cover up misdeeds. AFPF C.A.E.R. 590, 998-
990. Organizations may continue to misdirect assets 
or exploit donors while the State awaits compliance 
with its subpoena. AFPF C.A.E.R. 590, 998-990, 1029.  
Use of Schedule B also diminishes unwarranted 
burdens on charities. Screening with major-donor 
information is likely to prevent at least some 
investigations, as the State may conclude from 
Schedule B information that substantial contributors 
do not appear to be involved in transactions or 
activities that are being examined. If the Attorney 
General has available only the option of initiating an 
investigation in the case of suspected violations 
involving substantial donors, organizations with 
Schedule B’s that would have assuaged concerns up 
front will be subject to the disruption that a 




government investigation entails. State investiga-
tions, once opened, can take years to resolve. Attorney 
General’s Guide for Charities at 85. Resolving 
potential disputes at the pre-investigation stage thus 
has the potential to greatly reduce the time and 
resources an organization must devote to responding 
to an investigation.  
The burdens on charities that must respond to 
subpoenas go beyond the cost of compliance with or 
challenge to the subpoena; they include unnecessary 
reputational harm to a charity should the issuance of 
the subpoena become a public matter. Cf. Pollard v. 
Roberts, 283 F. Supp. 248, 257 (E.D. Ark.), aff’d, 393 
U.S. 14 (1968) (per curiam) (holding that state 
subpoena for political party contributors burdened 
recipients and was unconnected to any important 
state interest). While investigation subpoenas are not 
intended to be public, the secrecy of such a formal 
demand on an organization with numerous employees 
and other constituents cannot be presumed. For that 
reason, Attorneys General resolve investigations 
informally whenever possible, in an effort to avoid the 
reputational damage that is associated with a public 
government investigation. Attorney General’s Guide 
for Charities at 85. 
Finally, subpoenas can impose unnecessary 
burdens on third parties. If the Attorney General 
wishes to identify donors without alerting the 
organization under investigation or suspects that 
organization may not provide accurate information, 
the Attorney General may request documents from 
payment processors, outside fundraisers, or others 
with relevant information. None of these requests, or 
the time and expense necessary to fulfill them, would 




be needed if the information provided in the Schedule 
B obviated the need for the requests.  
III. Petitioners’ Views Would Threaten Central 
Elements of Both State and Federal Charity 
Reporting Regimes 
Contrary to the suggestion of Petitioners, 
Foundation Br. 45-47; Law Center Br. 53-55, and the 
United States, U.S. Amicus Br. 24, if the Court were 
to hold that California’s request for Schedule B is 
unconstitutional, that holding could threaten many 
other important elements of nonprofit oversight, 
including federal law. The purposes that Schedule B 
serves in California mirror those served by many other 
reporting provisions, under both California and 
federal law.  
First, for many charities the Schedule B is not 
reported confidentially to a government agency but is 
a fully public document. Donors of $5,000 or more to 
private foundations must be publicly disclosed.7 26 
U.S.C. § 6104(d)(1), (3)(A). Petitioner Americans for 
Prosperity Foundation never mentions this fact, and 
Thomas More mentions it only in passing. Law Center 
Br. 7. Congress required public reporting of private-
foundation donors as a way of ensuring accountability 
and preventing self-dealing at charities whose 
activities would otherwise be difficult for the public to 
observe. General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 
1969 at 52-53. 
                                            
7 For tax law purposes, all section 501(c)(3) organizations are 
either public charities or private foundations. A private 
foundation is defined (with certain exceptions) as one that draws 
its support from a relatively small number of donors. 26 U.S.C. § 
509(a). Petitioner Americans for Prosperity Foundation is not a 
“private foundation” under this definition, despite its name.  




Petitioners’ claims thus represent a direct 
challenge to the federal regime for supervising private 
foundations. Any supposed chilling effect on donors 
that results from California’s confidential reporting 
obligation seemingly would apply with even greater 
force to federal public disclosure of Schedule B for 
private foundations. A charity’s status as either a 
public charity (confidential reporting of major donors 
to the government) or a private foundation (public 
disclosure of major donors) can turn on knife’s-edge 
facts, such as whether the fraction of revenue derived 
from sources other than substantial contributors 
exceeds one-third of its revenues over the applicable 
testing period, 26 U.S.C. § 509(a)(2)(A). It cannot be 
the law that such a charity’s constitutional rights will 
change from year to year as its revenue from these 
sources ranges between thirty-two and thirty-four 
percent.  
Next, many other items currently reported and 
publicly disclosed by charities could potentially reveal 
information about private individuals, and so could 
affect those individuals’ willingness to support or 
associate with a given charity. As argued above, the 
Form 990 lists key employees, board members, 
contractors, and certain grantees. All of these parties 
are essential to a charity’s ongoing mission. If public 
disclosure in fact discouraged these individuals and 
entities from associating with the charity, that effect 
would threaten the charity’s operations more directly 
than a small decrease in donor enthusiasm. And, like 
major-donor information, each of these reporting 
items could in theory be obtained via subpoena or 
investigative demand rather than being reported 
annually on a tax return.  




Further, and again similar to major-donor 
information, information about key personnel and 
transactions contributes importantly to the ability of 
the Attorney General and the IRS to ensure that 
charities comply with applicable law. Typically, no one 
piece of information identifies prospective self-dealing. 
AFPF JA 413. Instead, each piece contributes 
incrementally to a picture that regulators can use to 
identify potentially suspect transactions. See 
Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480 n.10 (1976) 
(“Like a jigsaw puzzle, the whole ‘picture’ of 
petitioner's false-pretense scheme with respect to Lot 
13T could be shown only by placing in the proper place 
the many pieces of evidence that, taken singly, would 
show comparatively little.”). For example, if a major 
donor also appears as a contractor to the organization, 
and that donor’s close relatives serve as the 
organization’s board members, the contracting 
relationship will likely receive closer scrutiny than if 
the Attorney General could observe any of those facts 
only in isolation.  
Thus, there is no ready way to distinguish 
reporting of major-donor information from other 
routine forms of information reporting. Data about an 
organization’s activities, key supporters, and other 
insiders form a web of information that supervisory 
agencies use to draw inferences about which 
organizations merit closer scrutiny. See AFPF JA 311. 
If the Court accepts Petitioners’ arguments with 
respect to one strand of that web, it could endanger the 
other strands and result in the collapse or substantial 
weakening of effective regulation of charities. 
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